

18 February 1954

~~SECRET~~
~~Security Information~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

OFFICE OF TRAINING (SPECIAL)

DIRECTIVE

Vault No. 295

Ref. Copy

COURSE: Phase I - Orientation

SUBJECT: Organization for National Security HOURS: 2

METHOD OF PRESENTATION: Lecture INSTRUCTOR: [REDACTED]

25X1A9a

OBJECTIVES OF INSTRUCTION:

SUMMARY OF PRESENTATION:

295

SUBJECTS WITH WHICH COORDINATION IS REQUIRED:

REFERENCES:

REMARKS:

Document No. <u>1</u>
No Change in Class. ☐
☐ Declassified
Glass. Changed To: TS S <u>Q</u>
Auth.: <u>HR 10-2</u>
Date: <u>021078</u> By: <u>025</u>

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SECRET

TAB

SECRET

Approved For Release 2000/08/16 : CIA-RDP78-03362A000700090001-2
Organization for National Security

I propose to talk to you this morning about the agencies of national security. By the agencies of national security I mean those offices, departments, and independent agencies of our government that are charged with the protection of our national interests both domestically and overseas. I think when we get through our catalog of them we will see that there is quite a collection of offices, departments, agencies involved in this field of national security. They are of importance to us in this intelligence business because we supply the evaluated information upon which they act. Their actions in the field of national security rarely could be better than the information upon which they are based, and CIA and the other intelligence agencies have a grave responsibility in furnishing them with the evaluated information upon which they are going to take the actions, make the decisions, start things moving that affect, and we hope, guarantee our national security. Well, now let's run very briefly through these agencies to see the types that they fall into, something of their duties and responsibilities. I'm afraid this will seem a little like Political Science I, but if you will be patient we will not spend too much time on each one of them.

First of all, we start off with the President, who under our Constitution is charged more than any other officer of the government with the insurance of our national security. He has a number of constitutional powers in this field. He is charged with the appointment and instruction of various officers, many of whom, delegated by him, have responsibilities of national security. Members of his cabinet, chairman

SECRET

Approved For Release 2000/08/16 : CIA-RDP78-03362A000700090001-2

SECRET

Approved For Release 2000/08/16 : CIA-RDP78-03362A000700090001-2

-2-

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, heads of the military services, such as General Collins at present, General Vandenberg of the Air Force, and other officers of that type, civilian officers, the Secretary of State, and heads of important agencies of one kind or another. Well, through these people whom he appoints, he discharges much of his responsibility in this field. Then, he is the commander in chief of the Armed Forces, and that is a very important power or function that he has in connection with national security. The President is charged with the conduct of our foreign relations. He appoints ministers and ambassadors, receives ambassadors and ministers from foreign countries, negotiates treaties, and in other ways carries on our diplomatic relations. He is empowered to recommend action to Congress. Much of the action is concerned with domestic affairs, but quite a lot is concerned with this broad field of national security, such as appropriations for foreign aid, for the military services, or other activities in the national security field, as well as certain laws that he feels should be passed in order more effectively to safeguard our national security.

The most important body associated with the Presidential office in the discharge of his duties in the field of national security is the National Security Council. I'm going into it in some detail in a few minutes, but I'll just mention it at this point and then pass over to a number of departments and agencies in this field. The National Security Council dates from 1947 when it was established by law as the principal policy advisory body in the field of national security bringing together the heads of the chief agencies charged with national security, providing a mechanism whereby they could recommend to the President what they thought desirable policies of national security.

Approved For Release 2000/08/16 : CIA-RDP78-03362A000700090001-2

Leaving the NSC aside for a moment we come to the Department of State. The Secretary of State is the President's principal lieutenant in the field of foreign policy. I'd say that the Secretary has two functions: in the first place, he formulates and executes the foreign policy of the country within the limits of existing law, presidential directives, and NSC policy statements; in other words he doesn't have a mission that is uncircumscribed. He must work in close co-operation with the President and follow the President's directives and advice. He is limited by law, and he is limited by these policies of the NSC. Once they are approved by the President, they are binding upon the Secretary of State as upon other agencies of the government.

Well, then, secondly, he has the administration of the Department of State, the organization of the many thousands of employees here in Washington, other parts of this country, and, of course, abroad in every country in which we have diplomatic relations. The administration of a department of this size is a huge undertaking.

The Department of Defense dates from the same act as created the NSC. This act of 1947, the NSC Act, Public Law 253 passed by the 80th Congress. Prior to that time as you well know, we had a War Department and we had a Navy Department. Within the War Department there was a large semi-autonomous unit concerned with the Air Force. This Act of 1947 set up three departments concerned with military services, the Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, and the Department of the Air Force; and then it placed over the three a Department of Defense. The duties of the Secretary of Defense are set forth in this act as the following:

for the national military establishment and for all the departments and agencies therein—that is, the Departments of Army, Navy, and Air Force.

(2) He was to exercise general direction, authority and control over such departments and agencies.

(3) He was to take appropriate steps to eliminate unnecessary duplication or overlapping in the fields of procurement, supply, transportation, storage, help, and research.

(4) He was to supervise and coordinate the preparation of the budget estimates of the departments and agencies comprising the national military establishment; formulate and determine the budget estimates for submittal to the Bureau of the Budget and supervise the budget programs of such departments and agencies under the applicable appropriation act.

In other words, his was a coordinating, supervising activity. The running of these military services was left to the secretaries and their military advisors in the respective departments.

Also created by this Act of 1947 was a board or council known as the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Joint Chiefs of Staff had been set up some years previously during World War II, but it had not had a statutory basis; it was given this basis by the Act of 1947. The Joint Chiefs originally consisted of the three heads of the military services -- professional heads of the military services -- Chief of Staff of the Army, Chief of Naval Operations, and the Chief of the Air Force Staff. In 1949 there was added a fourth officer, a chairman who is not a representative of any one service but is, as his name implies, the presiding officer of the other three, their point of contact with the Secretary of Defense,

~~SECRET~~

Approved For Release 2000/08/16 : CIA-RDP78-03362A000700090001-2

with the National Security Council, and with the President. This office is held now by Admiral Radford. The role of the Joint Chiefs was expounded at one time by General Bradley in a talk, and I think he has given it as clearly and as plainly as it can be put. Let me quote just a little of his statement to you. He says, "I believe that it is important (he had been talking about the various possible solutions to the Korean War) for all of us to understand the role that the Joint Chiefs of Staff play in our national policy making because many people believe that during times of stress like these the military, as we are loosely labeled, have dangerous and undue powers in the influencing of our national policy. Actually, the role of the Joint Chiefs of Staff by law and by practice is a subordinate role and one which we zealously observe. It is important to remember and in the Joint Chiefs of Staff we are constantly reminding ourselves that military policy and its included strategic planning is not separate and distinct from our foreign policy. The two of them are part and parcel of our overall policy for the safety and security of our nation. Under the NS Act the JCS are charged with several specific duties. Among these is listed "principal military advisors to the President, the NSC, and the Secretary of Defense." We are charged with making strategic plans and providing for the strategic direction of the military forces of the nation in peace and war. When the government is concerned with the establishment of policy, the President receives recommendations from the Department of State on foreign policy; he considers domestic political advice, including guidance from the Congress in the matter of existing laws. He studies the economic implications of the specific problem, considers the psychological aspects of the policy, and from the Department of Defense

Approved For Release 2000/08/16 : CIA-RDP78-03362A000700090001-2

SECRET

Approved For Release 2000/08/16 : CIA-RDP78-03362A000700090001-2

-6-

he gets military advice in connection with the proposed policy. The agency with which he discusses all the factors and which assists him in arriving at the decision is the NSC. As the military advisors of the government, we - that is, the Joint Chiefs - feel that our job is to take the various courses of action that are suggested in the problem and analyze them from the military viewpoint, telling the President, through the Secretary of Defense, what our capabilities are and as far as we know, what risks are being taken when we pursue either this course or that course of action. I am sure you have read in recent weeks that a good deal of attention is being given to a possible re-organization of the Department of Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Secretary Lovett, who was Secretary of Defense until the new administration came in, left as his valedictory some recommendations with respect to the re-organization of his department; and Dr. Vannevar Bush, who has been an advisor particularly of scientific matters for some years both in the Department of Defense and other agencies of the government, has written from time to time about the need for re-organization, both of the Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff."

In general, these proposals are much too complex to go into in detail, but in general the suggestions are along the line of strengthening the position of the Secretary of Defense, and giving him more authority over the three service departments and more of a staff with which to operate within the very large, complex, and highly organized military establishment. In connection with the Joint Chiefs, the principal criticism has been that the Chiefs consist, with the exception of the Chairman, of these three professional heads of the services - chief of staff of the Army, chief of Naval Operations, chief of the Air Staff.

Approved For Release 2000/08/16 : CIA-RDP78-03362A000700090001-2

and these officers are extremely busy and occupied gentlemen, as you can see, as they are running the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force - very large and important military organizations - and in addition to this they are called on to meet as a group under the chairmanship to consider broad strategy problems of the allocations of resources, war plans, matters of that sort that concern the whole military policy of the country. There is just some question whether three men, staffed excellently as they may be, can carry out these duties satisfactorily - as they are likely to slight either their chief of staff duty within their service or their duty on the Joint Chiefs as a member of that committee.

Well, so much for the Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff; the rest of these agencies I'll just touch on briefly. Their names will be familiar to you and I think their duties are fairly obvious.

The Treasury gets into this national security field largely because it has within its walls the Coast Guard - and the Coast Guard has important responsibilities in connection with the protection of our ports and coastal areas. In time of war the Coast Guard is usually placed under the Navy Department, but it is a civilian managed agency in times of peace. Then there is the National Security Resources Board. This is another agency that was created by the Act of 1947. The idea was to set up a body which could study the long range problems, implications, of mobilization, problems of getting the sources of material and manpower that we needed, raw materials, manufacturing facilities, the skills and talents in manpower that would be necessary to put our country in a correct defense posture. Civil Defense was another responsibility of

Approved For Release 2000/08/16 : CIA-RDP78-03362A000700090001-2

~~SECRET~~

this organization. It consisted of a number of cabinet members, Secretaries of State, Treasury, Defense, Interior, Agriculture, Commerce, and Labor. They, plus a chairman appointed by the President, constituted the board. The board had a life of about two or three years as an active institution - in 1950 the President established an office called the Office of Defense Mobilization with Mr. Charles E. Wilson as the director of it. It was brought into being by the problems of mobilization caused by the Korean military action starting in June 1950, and the Office of Defense Mobilization took over most of the functions that the NSRB had been performing. It was found quite impracticable to divide long range mobilization planning from the short range planning that ODM was doing - the allocation of resources, the control of wages and prices, the allocation of manpower from one critical industry to another, the general stabilization of the economy that was attempted by Mr. Wilson and the ODM. So that practically all the important functions that NSRB had been performing were assumed by ODM. President Eisenhower sent to Congress Reorganization Plan #3, and one of its provisions was the abolition of NSRB, the transfer of its remaining functions to a permanent ODM under a director appointed by the President.

Another agency in this field is the Mutual Security Agency. It is the successor to the Economic Cooperation Administration which was set up in 1947 to administer the Marshall Plan of economic aid to the countries principally in Western Europe. The Marshall Plan was to expire after four years, and it did technically expire, but as so often happens, something else arose to take its place before it finally gave up the ghost; and a program of mutual economic assistance was devised to continue the flow of dollars into the economies of these countries

SECRET

Approved For Release 2000/08/16 : CIA-RDP78-03362A000700090001-2

overseas. The name of ECA was changed to MSA, Mutual Security Agency. It is still principally concerned with what we could call economic and technical aid programs; that is, programs of helping in one way or another to bolster the economies of these countries in which we have a security interest. In the beginning the aid was principally directed toward basic industries that would strengthen the economies of these countries without much regard to their military power. MSA has slated its present programs toward the strengthening of military potentials of these countries, not by direct shipment of arms, because strictly military aid is administered by the Department of Defense; but MSA administers aid with an eye to the construction of industries, the rebuilding of industries, making them more efficient and so on, that serve to bolster up the military power potentiality of these countries. The technical aid programs are directed somewhat in the same direction. The technical aid programs should be distinguished from what is called Point Four aid, which is administered by the Department of State, and which is directed toward very long range improvements of basic skills and techniques -- trying to get people that have used a sharp stick as a plow to substitute a metal hoe and similar changes of technique of that kind. MSA is represented overseas by missions in all the countries that are receiving United States aid administered by this agency; these MSA missions are headed by directors or chiefs of missions responsible to the Director of Mutual Security here, who is now Mr. Stassen. Military aid is administered in these various countries receiving it by what are called MAAG missions - Military Aid Assistance Groups - and then in addition, their Point Four missions which have their headquarters in the

Department of State. It is the proliferation of these missions of one

Approved For Release 2000/08/16 : CIA-RDP78-03362A000700090001-2

sort or another in foreign countries and their rather uncoordinated activities that has given rise to a good deal of criticism about the large American staffs that are stationed abroad and about their duplication of effort and their uncoordinated relations with the countries where they are stationed.

Let's turn for a moment to another agency - the Psychological Strategy Board - this was created two years ago by an executive order of the President. It had then and it has now no statutory basis. It grew out of a feeling that such psychological warfare as we were conducting was not very carefully planned and was certainly not very carefully coordinated. Some was being conducted by the Department of State through the Voice of America, through various educational programs of the department; and other agencies dealing in the national security field were dipping here and there into propaganda and psychological warfare activities. So the idea was to try to create a planning strategy board which would bring some order and method to the activities of these various agencies. The board consists of the Under-Secretary of State, the Under-Secretary of Defense, and the Director of CIA. Added to the board is a full-time director; as you see, these other gentlemen have important jobs in their own departments, so they are only part-time members. The activities of the Board are conducted by the full-time member. It has a relatively small staff, drawn from the Department of State, Department of Defense, and from CIA. The Board has engaged in the last two years in planning activities, trying to draw up sort of a master plan which could then be put into effect by Defense or State, the two principal operating departments in this field. It has attempted, in evaluation of our propaganda efforts, to see whether they could be strengthened in

Approved For Release 2000/08/16 : CIA-RDP78-03362A000700090001-2

one way or another. There has been a good deal of dissatisfaction with not only the Board but all our propaganda efforts, and Mr. Eisenhower, upon becoming President, almost immediately appointed a commission to examine the whole field, appointing a gentleman by the name of Jackson, C.D. Jackson, as one member, and Mr. William Jackson, a former deputy director of CIA, as a second member to look into the PSB and all its operations. Shortly thereafter, he moved Mr. C.D. Jackson into the White House as a personal assistant on propaganda and psychological warfare; since then, as a result of the committee report, the Operation Coordinating Board has been formed. On September 3 President Eisenhower created the OCB under the NSC to "strengthen the security programs of the United States in the world struggle". The new board will report to the NSC. The chairman of this board is Walter Bedell Smith. Other members are Roger M. Keyes, deputy Secretary of Defense; Harold E. Stassen, director of the Foreign Operations Administration; Allen Dulles, DCI; and C.D. Jackson, special assistant to the president. The conduct of psychological warfare and democracy is one of the most difficult things to be carried on. In a totalitarian state you can have a propaganda line which is laid down from above, and all your media propaganda follow this line. It can twist and turn as the people at the top decide is best. But that is obviously impossible in a democratic state where questions can freely be asked, answers sought, where all the media of diffusion are independently owned and operated and where there is slight control over even the official agencies of diffusion.

Another agency in this field is the Federal Civil Defense Administration. It's a title, I think, which is an obvious clue to its functions. It is principally a planning and coordinating agency. As the

~~SECRET~~

legislation under which it acts puts most of the responsibility for civil defense measures upon the states and municipalities. The states and the municipalities are to build the warning systems, provide the blood banks and the stocks of medicines and various materials that might be needed in an emergency, and do all the other things that are associated with civil defense. But planning and coordinating is to be a federal function and FCBA is the agency for that purpose. The Atomic Energy Commission is an agency familiar to all of us, at least by name. Its functions are plain. It carries on research and production activities in the field of atomic energy.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation has a domestic security responsibility. It is to locate and take measures to suppress subversive activity, to counter sabotage activities within the country, and in other ways to protect our security from the domestic point of view. It has no overseas responsibilities. It's entirely restricted to this country.

Last in our group is the Central Intelligence Agency. It is a creature also of the Act of 1947 although the Act gave statutory basis to an agency that had been created the year before, the Central Intelligence Group, (CIG). You will be hearing a great deal about CIA, its mission, responsibilities, organization, and activities; so I will just mention it as belonging to this group of national security agencies. All these that I have mentioned belong in the executive establishment of our government. You may ask what role Congress plays in this. Well, Congress has several responsibilities which, if they are not discharged, would bring most of this apparatus to a stand-still. In the first place, Congress must appropriate money to carry it on and these

Approved For Release 2000/08/16 : CIA-RDP78-03362A000700090001-2

appropriations sometimes determine the way in which these national security activities will be conducted. Appropriations, for example, for foreign aid may have conditions attached to them determining how that aid shall be allotted and administered among various countries. Besides appropriating money, Congress enacts legislation affecting our national security, legislation affecting the armed forces, affecting the operations of all these agencies that I have mentioned - legislation against sabotage and subversion, against the immigration of undesirable persons who might jeopardize our national security. Sometimes, too, Congress passes resolutions expressing points of view in the field of national security. An outstanding example is the so-called Vandenberg resolution passed by Congress in 1947 which was an expression of opinion that laid the basis for the North Atlantic Treaty; in other words, Congress was saying that if the countries of Western Europe who border on the Atlantic - that was the original conception - would join us in pooling our efforts for better national security and better regional security, Congress would, by appropriate legislation, in other ways support such a group of treaty powers. After that resolution was passed, the State Department proceeded to negotiate with the various countries and finally the North Atlantic Treaty was ratified or was signed by these countries, and duly ratified by the Senate of the United States. The Senate has two special powers that could be mentioned: first, there is the confirmation of appointments, and we would mean there those that are within the field of national security - ambassadors and ministers, chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, other important officers of the military establishment, heads of these various agencies, such as the Atomic

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

Approved For Release 2000/08/16 : CIA-RDP78-03362A000700090001-2

Energy Commission, Federal Civil Defense Administration, etc. We have from time to time examples of the way in which the Senate examines the credentials of these gentlemen and expresses views as to their fitness or unfitness. The ratification of treaties is the second special power of the Senate - any formal treaty negotiated by the president must be ratified in order to make it a part of the law of the land by two-thirds vote of the Senate. And in such ratification, conditions may be attached which have an effect on our security arrangement. Now I have run through the principal agencies of national security and I want to come back to the one which is of the greatest importance to us in CIA - the National Security Council. I say it is of the greatest importance to us for two reasons: It is our master if we have one, and I think we can be sure we do have. It is from the NSC that CIA gets its various directives, determining its mission, directing somewhat its organization and establishing its relationships with the other intelligence agencies of our government. These directives come to the Director of Central Intelligence in the form of National Security Council Intelligence Directives; there have been about fifteen issued so far. I think you can see by the number that the directives are not of the detailed, day by day sort - they are of a very general supervisory kind. But nevertheless, it is a kind of a council that gives to the Director of Central Intelligence his basic instructions, tells him the jobs he thinks - the council thinks - the CIA should be performing, allots responsibilities between the CIA, G-2, ONI, and so on, and in other ways manage this agency. The second reason is the NSC is our principal customer. As I started by saying, we're in the business to supply evaluated information that can serve as a basis of action for national security. The principal customer for this

Approved For Release 2000/08/16 : CIA-RDP78-03362A000700090001-2

SECRET

Approved For Release 2000/08/16 : CIA-RDP78-03362A000700090001-2

production of ours is the NSC, its members individually and collectively.

The National Security Council did not spring full blown like Athena from the head of Zeus, but had a fairly long history behind it. Before World War II, the principal advisors to the President in the field of national security policy were the Secretary of State, Secretary of War, and Secretary of the Navy. In times of peace the President relied principally on the Secretary of State. Our military establishment was small and our foreign missions were almost all of a political or diplomatic rather than a military character. Then in times of war the situation was reversed. The Secretary of State receded as the principal advisor and the Secretaries of War and Navy became the principal advisors. In times of peace foreign policy was conducted with comparatively little concern for the military risks and responsibilities involved. I'm afraid in time of war military affairs were conducted with comparatively little concern for the political implications. There is no substitute for victory. We must fight the war all out, and forget about the political implications. We'll settle them all up at the end of the war; and so you had a situation whereby we alternated from a policy that gave relatively little weight to political risks or to political implications. Many people had observed the unsatisfactory nature of that and felt that some machinery was highly desirable that would bring in to line our political and our military responsibilities, that would add up the various types of risks that we were assuming and strike some balance that would best serve our national interests. It may be asked, Why didn't the Cabinet serve as that kind of a body? It is an official advisory body to the President; why couldn't he use it? Well, I think there are two reasons why the cabinet was not satisfactory. In the

Approved For Release 2000/08/16 : CIA-RDP78-03362A000700090001-2

SECRET

first place, it considers many things not related to our national security. The cabinet will take up in one meeting the problem of whether third-class postmasters should be under civil service and at the next meeting the content of a presidential speech on foreign policy and perhaps at the following meeting the problem of settling a labor strike on the west coast. Sandwiched in are a few problems of national security, the problem of conscription of the people for the army, problems of reorganization, and so on. In other words, it has the whole range of problems only part of which are concerned with national security. It isn't able to give a continuous and deep consideration to this one aspect of our national policy. The second reason is I think that the President would not wish to scatter throughout his whole official family the type of classified information upon which members of a high security policy board would have to operate or would have to have in their possession. Not that he would distrust the members of his cabinet; but in order for the cabinet members to be properly briefed they would have to have staffs receiving this information, going through the papers, marking the things of importance, briefing them down for their cabinet heads and in other ways coming into possession of this often very highly classified information. There is no reason why the Postmaster General and a half a dozen officials in the postal department need to know the highly classified information that the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense have to know in order to reach a decision on security policy.

During World War II a couple of steps were taken that lead into the present National Security Council. For one thing, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as I mentioned earlier, was set up as a committee, a board of the

SECRET

¹⁷
~~SECRET~~

highest military officers of the government. It consisted of the Chief of Staff of the Army, the Chief of Naval Operations, and the Chief of the Air Force, although he was not by law at that time on a par with the other two; but General Arnold was admitted by their councils as a representative of what was, in practice, a coordinate service, and then there was, during the war, Admiral Leahy, who was a personal representative of the President. They constituted the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Sitting with their British opposite numbers, they constituted the combining Chiefs of Staff, and the high strategy of the war was worked out by either the two Joint Chiefs, American and British, sitting separately and then sitting together as a combined Chiefs. That brought some coordination and unification into the military establishment where it had not existed before. There still was no link with the civilian side of the government that was concerned with national security. Mr. Roosevelt adopted a practice that previous presidents had used of appointing a sort of unofficial coordinator from his own White House staff. Mr. Harry Hopkins, for example, served throughout most of the war as an unofficial coordinator of all kinds of security policy, bringing together the diplomatic and military aspects of the war effort. As I said, that is a tactic that had been used by previous presidents. President Wilson was notable with Colonel House. As an example, though, of how toward the close of the war our high policy was uncoordinated and produced by different agencies who got to the President by their own separate channels and impressed upon him their views which he could accept or reject, we might consider the conditions which we drew up and used as a basis for post-war policy in Germany. President Roosevelt went to the Quebec conference in 1943, I think, and conducted

drawn up, not by the Secretary of State or even by the Secretary of War, but by the Secretary of the Treasury, the so-called Morgenthau Plan; and the Secretaries, whom you might expect to be most concerned about our occupation duties post-war policy in the event of the defeat of Germany, learned about the Plan at a later date. To carry it one step further, the Plan that was actually put into operation was not a plan of the Treasury Department or again either of the State or War, but was a Joint Chiefs of Staff directive - JCS 1067 - and that continued for quite a while as the basis of our postwar policy toward Germany. Not that the policy would have been different or that the course of history was greatly changed by the use of one memorandum instead of another, or the fact that this was a JCS directive and not a joint State-War directive. It just indicates that there was no coordination within the governmental machinery for the production of policy and plans that had been carefully considered by all the agencies concerned and agreed to in advance. Toward the end of the war, State and the military services did get together in a committee arrangement that was a direct predecessor of the NSC. It was a committee known as SWNCC - State, War, Navy, Coordinating Committee - and it was succeeded by something known as SANAC - State, Army, Navy, Air Committee. SWNCC came into existence because as the war was drawing to a close a large number of political-military problems arose, problems such as these: in the countries we were occupying militarily, we had encountered refugees that had to be taken care of - displaced persons. We had to deal with governments in exile, we were arming various ~~indigen-~~ous peoples. All of these things had political-military aspects. In a country which we were occupying there might be two or three political groups each seeking our recognition - well, somebody had to decide which

was going to be the government we would recognize, who was to receive our military and economic aid, what was to be done by the political groups that were not recognized; that is, were they to be brought into the government if we could exert sufficient pressure on the legitimate government to do it, or were they to be ostracized with our blessing? This committee consisted of the State-War-Navy Departments. It was organized at the Assistant Secretary level, it had a staff that tried to prepare recommendations for the full committee when it met; after the committee had agreed on the policy or plan, then the secretaries of these respective departments had to approve. If they approved, there was an exchange of agreements and the plan was then implemented by each department within its sphere. A disadvantage of this SWNCC-SANAC type of organization was that it operated too low down in the official hierarchy. It needed to be up at the Secretary level rather than the Assistant Secretary level; that would have given it not only greater prestige throughout the government; it would also help coordination within the departments because the problem was not so much that of getting coordination with another department as of getting coordination within one's own department. That is, whoever represented SWNCC in the War Department had the problem of getting together not only with Navy and State, but also with the various interest groups within his own organization. The experience of SWNCC and SANAC was a very valuable one in spite of its deficiencies and led directly to the establishment of the NSC in 1947. Another influence which played a considerable part in our planning at this time was the experience that some of our high officials had had with British defense organizations during the war. The British had had since 1904 a committee of cabinet ministers known as the Committee of Im-

Approved For Release 2000/08/16 : CIA-RDP78-03362A000700090001-2

~~SECRET~~

perial Defense. The cabinet ministers were associated with the fields of foreign policy and military security. the Secretary of State for foreign affairs, the first Lord of the Admiralty, the Secretary of State for War, and several other cabinet officers of that rank. It had a permanent secretariat with a staff to prepare its papers, present the issues in a clear, concise way to the committee when it met. For about forty years it had been studying the questions of high strategy and policy for the British government. Mr. Forrestal, for one, who was the Secretary of the Navy in the latter part of the war and then first Secretary of Defense, was very much impressed with this British organization and felt that we ought to have something comparable to it in our system.

Well, NSC then appears in the National Security Act of 1947. The Act gives these as its functions: The first duty of the Council: to assess and appraise the objectives, commitments, and risks of the United States in relation to our actual and potential military power in the interest of national security, for the purpose of making recommendations to the President in connection therewith. To assess and appraise the objectives, commitments, and risks of the United States in relation to our actual and potential military power in the interest of national security - that was the first thing that it was to do. In other words, this was to try to correct that weakness that I said had existed before and during World War II of conducting our diplomacy without adequate regard to our military power and potential, or secondly, conducting military operations without adequate consideration of the political implications of these operations. This was an attempt to weigh all aspects of national security and allot the proper consideration to each one of them.

The second duty of the Council: to consider policies on matters of common interest to the departments and agencies of the government concerned with national security, and to make recommendations to the President in connection therewith. In plain language this was a mandate to try to settle interdepartmental disputes in the field of national security concerning State, War, Navy, and now the Defense. These Departments could not agree - here was a meeting place - a forum where the top heads of these departments got together. In other words, this was going to correct that deficiency of the SWNCC-SANAC system where you operated at too low a level, and where sometimes issues could not be resolved because the highest officials of the department could not be gotten to bring their time and attention to them. Well, those are the two functions that were given to NSC.

Let's consider now its organization, the way in which it operates. Its membership has changed a little bit from time to time. It consists now of the President, Vice President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Treasury, the Director of Foreign Operations Administration, a permanent request member, the Director of Defense Mobilization, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Director of Central Intelligence. The latter two are non-voting members. They sit there by right, but they are not voting members of the Council. The President may invite in other members; the Vice-President is regularly invited. Mr. Truman thought it important that the Vice-President sit with the Council because as he pointed out when he succeeded to the Presidency in 1945, he was almost entirely uninformed about security policy and for several weeks had to grope around until he became properly briefed as to what our plans and strategy were. So he felt it important that that lack

be remedied by having the Vice-President a member of the National Security Council. The President may invite other members - the Attorney General upon occasion, the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of Agriculture, the Director of Civil Defense. It is customary to invite any one of these officers when some matter is before the Council that concerns their department. For example, if the Council is considering a matter of domestic security - say, the protection of important military installations in the United States - it would be important to have the Attorney General or the Director of the FBI there, since the responsibility of carrying out this policy would largely fall upon their department or bureau.

The Council represents the top echelon in this structure. It has below it two staffs. The one immediately below is called the Planning Board, which is the name that the new administration gave to a staff previously existing known as the Senior Staff. It's principally a change of name rather than of function. The Planning Board consists of deputies or high level assistants to the members of the Council. It meets three times a week and the idea is that the Planning Board will put into as finished a shape as possible the paper work of the Council before the Council members meet and try to reach decisions upon it. The members of the Planning Board are expected to be able to speak for their departments; that is, they're to be sufficiently senior within their own organizations that they can commit their departments and agencies to policy matters. For the State Department, the board member is the counselor of the department, Mr. Boland, until very recently, and now Mr. MacArthur. The Planning Board member for the Secretary of Defense is the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Mutual Security Affairs. For

CIA, it is the Deputy Director of the Agency. It usually is the Deputy or the Assistant Secretary level. Then the third echelon going down consists of a committee or a group known as board assistants. These are full-time assistants to the Planning Board representatives. These members of the Planning Board, like the Council members, are not full-time. The Deputy Director of CIA has a very large job other than that of sitting on the Planning Board of NSC. Mr. Nash in the Department of Defense has a great many activities besides NSC activities. The Counsellor of the State Department has other jobs besides sitting on the Planning Board. So each one has a full-time assistant whose job is principally that of preparing his board member for the board meetings. It is actually the board assistant who conducts most of the negotiating and coordinating within each one of these agencies. The member here in CIA is attached to the Office of National Estimates but he operates throughout the whole agency, trying to get a coordinated viewpoint when that is necessary, so that the Planning Board member represents the entire agency in his discussions. Besides these three levels at which the Council operates, it has an executive secretariat consisting of an executive secretary, a deputy to him, and three or four assistants to the secretary. They are full-time officials who take care of all the paper work, the preparation under the direction of the president of the agenda, the assembling of all the papers that have to be gotten together and then distributed to the members of these various staffs, recording of the minutes and the actions taken by the Council and by the staffs, and many similar activities. Then a feature of the Council under the Eisenhower administration has been the appointment of seven outside consultants. These are substantial private citizens who are supposed to represent various aspects of our

SECRET

national life. There are business men, one college president, one head of a labor organization, one newspaper publisher, one or two people representing other professional fields. The idea is to call them in and give them a briefing upon certain problems on which the Council is working, and then ask for their advice. I think it is a question just how that is going to operate in practice. It's quite an innovation, and may be highly successful or may fall short of its purpose. On the whole it has been very difficult to add to bodies of this kind, either people from outside government circles or people from within government who did not have operating responsibilities. It's been proposed in the past that the NSC ought to have some sort of senior advisors on it - people who were not charged with day to day operating responsibilities, who could sit and brood upon all the very serious and difficult problems and then come up with inspirational solutions. Well, when you get to devising a system such as that in practice, you run into many difficulties, and generally we have found it better to try to operate with the people who have the responsibilities of these great departments on their shoulders. They are busy, they are harried, they're worried, overtaxed, etc., but when they decide something, it can then be put into practice, and we don't have the problem of coordination with unattached advisors who then have no responsibility for carrying out these things that they recommend. Mr. Churchill, in one of his war memoirs, talks about various suggestions that were made to him for adding to the War Cabinet Ministers without portfolio. The War Cabinet consisted of the Foreign Secretary and Minister of Defense, Minister of War Production, various people who, besides having the consultative responsibilities of the Cabinet, had these very heavy operating responsibilities of their own ministries. But he rejected this

~~SECRET~~

advice on the ground that ministers without portfolios came more and more to be unreal advisors; they didn't really have to wrestle with the problems of important departments; they read a lot of memoranda and papers and so forth, and they pondered, thought, and what not; but they really never had to come to grips and make real decisions. As Churchill said, he found that he didn't want unharnessed people around him who in the end cut a figure and never really got down to grips with the serious problems of the war. I think on the whole that has been our experience, but this effort to bring in outside consultants will be an interesting one.

Another innovation of the Eisenhower Administration has been the appointment in the White House as one of the President's assistants of a staff assistant of National Security Affairs, who is Mr. Robert Cutler. In the past, the executive secretary of the NSC has been the President's link with the Council. Now the President has a special assistant for that purpose. The preparation of the agenda of the Council is one of his present responsibilities, and he also presides over the Planning Board. It is his job to see that all the paper work is wrapped up in order that the coordination that can be accomplished before the Council meeting has been accomplished; that problems that needed consideration were actually brought into the staff machinery and work was started on them, that no roadblocks, bottlenecks, etc., which are removable continue to exist.

Now a few words about the procedure of the Council. There are two ways in which problems can get before the NSC. The first way is for the President to refer a problem there and the second way is for a member of the Council other than the President to ask for Council consideration.

The President may refer to the Council any problem within the National

~~SECRET~~

Security field that he would like to have it consider. Now there is no requirement that he refer to the Council. He can keep it within its own desk, the immediate advisors in the White House, if he prefers, but if he desires Council consideration, all he has to do is notify the Staff Assistant that he would like to put on the agenda a problem, and it will duly appear. The Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, the Director of ODM, anyone of the Council members may likewise propose a problem. When the President or one of these Council members proposes a problem, it is referred by the executive secretary to the Planning Board and at the Planning Board level it is decided that one agency shall prepare a paper dealing with this problem. In nine-tenths of the cases, the State Department is tagged for this purpose because most of the problems are of a political or diplomatical character. While they may have military aspects, the military aspects are not as important as the political ones; certainly that has been true in the cold war period. So usually the State Department is asked to produce a paper on this subject. The State representative on the Planning Board carries this request back to his Department; someone in the Department is charged with bringing forth a paper when it is prepared. When it is prepared, coordinated within the Department of State, it is then introduced into the Planning Board of NSC. Copies are distributed to all the members and shortly thereafter this paper appears on the Agenda of the Planning Board. At this stage, the Planning Board attempts to discuss the general principles involved: does the paper cover the problem that was proposed? Are the solutions adequate to the problem: Have things been omitted that ought to have been considered? Are things in here that ought to have been left out? The general nature of the paper is discussed. Then it is customary to refer

Approved For Release 2000/08/16 : CIA-RDP78-03362A000700090001-2

the paper to the Board Assistants - that's the lowest echelon - and this group then goes to work to try in the light of the Planning Board discussions to produce an acceptable policy paper. They work on it maybe in several meetings. Finally the paper is refurbished and sent back to the Planning Board. The Planning Board considers it again, and they are now satisfied with it, it goes up to the Council with the recommendation that the Council approve it. It will appear on the Council agenda usually a week or two weeks in the future so that the Council members may have a chance to read it and get briefed by their staffs. Then it will be discussed at the Council meeting and a decision taken on it there. Now the decision is not a final decision; although the President presides, hears all the discussion, etc., he does not indicate whether he approves or disapproves. If the Council adopts this policy paper, it goes to the President, who, maybe two or three days later, indicates his approval, or maybe his approval with reservations. The NSC, and I want to stress this, is an advisory body, it is not a decision making body. It's to help the President come to his decisions and he may override all members of the body and come to quite a different decision than the NSC. I'm sure you perhaps heard this story about Lincoln and his cabinet - probably a hyperbole, but it illustrates the point pretty well. Lincoln was putting some problem to his cabinet, and it was duly discussed. There was a good deal of difference of opinion and finally, in the end, he asked for a vote which is rather unusual at cabinet meetings; but the vote went seven no's and one aye. Seven cabinet members voted against it and Lincoln voted for it. He announced the vote as seven votes NO and one vote AYE and the AYES have it. Well, that is the method of operation of the NSC.

SECRET

Approved For Release 2000/08/16 : CIA-RDP78-03362A000700090001-2

You may say, "Well, why should it operate this way? Why don't they come to a decision and have the President approve it at the meeting?" The reason is, and it is a very sound one, that the President has other considerations to take into account. The NSC considers security policy as it concerns these departments represented. Now there are other aspects to national policy. The President has to take into account a great many domestic aspects of this: he sees members of Congress who have views on these things; he talks with the members of his political party and the Chairman of the National Committee and the members of the National Committee itself; he sees many private citizens, labor leaders, business men, publishers, etc.; that is, he gets views from many sources besides the NSC, and while he gives great weight to the deliberations of the NSC, and it's most unusual for a President to disapprove a unanimous recommendation of the NSC, nevertheless he wants an opportunity to weigh these other considerations before he comes to his decision. Sometimes he will send the matter back to the NSC for reconsideration, and ask that this problem be thought out a little further and a new recommendation be sent to him. I think that is more probable than that he would disapprove of a total paper that was put before him.

After the President has signed the paper, each member of the Council is notified, "On June 26 the President approved the NSC 56/3," or whatever the number may be. Then the thing has to be carried out. The NSC is not an operating agency; it has no staff to carry out its decisions. It has just this little secretariat in the Executive Office Building down here at 17th and Penn. I suppose there are fifteen or twenty people, including secretaries and chauffeurs and everybody. Its a deliberate policy making body. The implementation of the policies decided

Approved For Release 2000/08/16 : CIA-RDP78-03362A000700090001-2

~~SECRET~~

Approved For Release 2000/08/16 : CIA-RDP78-03362A000700090001-2

upon is a responsibility of the departments represented on the Council. It's customary for each policy paper to conclude with a statement indicating which department or departments have the responsibility of carrying it out. In the majority of cases it's again the State Department that has the major responsibility of carrying out the policy. Many papers are divided with the main responsibility on the Secretary of State, with the support and coordination of the Secretary of Defense or the Director of Mutual Security and so forth. Usually if one or more departments are named, all other agencies of the government are charged with supporting and assisting the department or departments in carrying out the policy. An NSC policy paper, besides placing the responsibility, also calls for progress reports at regular intervals. These are usually on a quarterly or semi-annual or annual basis. These reports are submitted to the Council so that it can see what is happening to the policy, what's being done to carry it out. If a policy calls for increased military assistance to Patagonia, the Council wants to know after six months how many tanks, planes, how much ammunition and what not were actually shipped. If a policy calls for economic assistance, the Council wants to know just how many millions of dollars have been allotted by FOA, or what programs of economic or technical assistance have been devised. These progress reports are submitted by the agency that has primary responsibility for implementation, and they are considered by the Staff of the Council and then by the Council itself. The Council takes action simply by noting progress report so and so on Policy 56/4 or whatever it happens to be.

Well, that in general is the way this institution is organized and operates. I say, to us in CIA it's ^{an} extremely important organization

Approved For Release 2000/08/16 : CIA-RDP78-03362A000700090001-2

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

Approved For Release 2000/08/16 : CIA-RDP78-03362A000700090001-2

because from it we get our basic directives; it is the organization with which we are in business to serve as our main consumer. It is upon our products that these high officers of the government try to come to decisions to protect our national security.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Approved For Release 2000/08/16 : CIA-RDP78-03362A000700090001-2